How Can Beliefs Wrong?

The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions

Justin D’Arms, Daniel Jacobson · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2000 · 1K citations

Emotion Appropriate, Ethical Dilemma, Moral Philosophy +12

The Second-Person Standpoint

Monika Piotrowska · Polish Journal of Philosophy · 2007 · 679 citations

Personal Identity, Engineering, Interpersonal Communication +7

Deciding to trust, coming to believe

Richard Holton · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · 1994 · 671 citations

Trust Metric, Behavioral Decision Making, Trust Management Architecture +12

Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.

Matthias Steup, Edward Craig · The Philosophical Review · 1992 · 434 citations

Good Approximations, Formal Epistemology, Causal Theory +18

The Reasons we can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values

Christine M. Korsgaard · Social Philosophy and Policy · 1993 · 256 citations

Moral Reasoning, Behavioral Decision Making, Moral Philosophy +23