arXiv (Cornell University) · 2021 · 36 citations · 27 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceCommittee SystemsDecision TheoryFormal MethodsElectionsVoting RulesApproval VotingApproval Voting StrategyApproval-based Committee VotingCommittee ProportionalityMultiwinner VotingProportional Representation StrategyStrategyproof Mechanisms
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules such as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and Phragmén's rules have been shown to produce committees that are proportional, in the sense that they proportionally represent voters' preferences; all of these rules are strategically manipulable by voters. On the other hand, a generalisation of Approval Voting gives a non-proportional but strategyproof voting rule. We show that there is a fundamental tradeoff between these two properties: we prove that no multiwinner voting rule can simultaneously satisfy a weak form of proportionality (a weakening of justified representation) and a weak form of strategyproofness. Our impossibility is obtained using a formulation of the problem in propositional logic and applying SAT solvers; a human-readable version of the computer-generated proof is obtained by extracting a minimal unsatisfiable set (MUS). We also discuss several related axiomatic questions in the domain of committee elections.
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