Concepedia

Strategyproof Mechanisms

Strategyproof Mechanisms is a mechanism design concept in game theory and social choice theory that belongs to the class of incentive-compatible mechanisms, distinguished by the property that it always incentivizes each participant to truthfully reveal their private preferences, as no strategic misrepresentation can yield a more favorable outcome for any individual regardless of others' actions.

277

Publications

17.3K

Citations

353

Authors

216

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

78

Variants

Strategy-proof Mechanisms

Parents

Publications

277

Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Mark A. Satterthwaite · Journal of Economic Theory · 1975 · 2.9K citations

, , +13

Approval Voting

Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn · American Political Science Review · 1978 · 453 citations

, , +15

Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms

Shengwu Li · American Economic Review · 2017 · 451 citations

, , +16

Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency

Hervé Moulin, Scott Shenker · Economic Theory · 2001 · 369 citations

, , +9

Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

Szilvia Pápai · Econometrica · 2000 · 369 citations

, , +16

1–5 of 277

Authors

353

  1. AD
    Ariel D. Procaccia

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    12 publications · 873 citations

    12

    h-index

  2. SB
    Salvador Barberà

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain

    10 publications · 861 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. SS
    Shigehiro Serizawa

    Osaka University of Economics, Japan

    9 publications · 323 citations

    9

    h-index

  4. AS
    Arunava Sen

    Indian Statistical Institute, India

    9 publications · 241 citations

    9

    h-index

  5. HA
    Haris Aziz

    UNSW Sydney, Australia

    8 publications · 247 citations

    8

    h-index

1–5 of 353

Institutions

216

  1. Harvard University Press

    Cambridge, United States

    16 h-index

    16 publications

    1.5K citations

  2. Hebrew University of Jerusalem

    Jerusalem, Israel

    14 h-index

    17 publications

    912 citations

  3. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

    Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain

    11 h-index

    11 publications

    638 citations

  4. Carnegie Mellon University

    Pittsburgh, United States

    10 h-index

    10 publications

    848 citations

  5. Indian Statistical Institute

    Kolkata, India

    10 h-index

    10 publications

    268 citations

  6. UNSW Sydney

    Sydney, Australia

    9 h-index

    9 publications

    329 citations

  7. Stanford University

    Stanford, United States

    9 h-index

    9 publications

    413 citations

  8. Data61

    Sydney, Australia

    9 h-index

    9 publications

    279 citations

1–8 of 216

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 20 publications · 4.1K citations

    18

    h-index

  2. Social Choice and Welfare

    18 publications · 960 citations

    14

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 13 publications · 513 citations

    13

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    12 publications · 1.4K citations

    12

    h-index

  5. Games and Economic Behavior

    12 publications · 500 citations

    11

    h-index

1–5