Caching Games between ISP in Information Centric Network

Abstract

Information Centric Network ICN is a future network architecture, wich has recently emerged to improve performance of the current Internet, in ICN content is located by name not by location. This paper develop game theoretic models to study the interaction between ISP in an ICN model where the ISP is motivated to cache content. We analyze the behavior of ISPs in terms of their strategies within the framework of non-cooperative game theory. In turn, the subscribers' demand for the service of an ISP depends not only on their strategies, but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. We provide some interesting results regarding the Nash equilibrium of this game. More precisely, we showed existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. Furthermore, we introduce learning algorithms that may lead ISPs to learn their strategies at Nash equilibriums. Extensive simulations show the convergence to the Nash equilibrium and give the effect of caching in ISPs strategies. This paper shows through economic analysis that caching is beneficial for ISP and users.