An enhanced-security buck DC-DC converter with true-random-number-based pseudo hysteresis controller for internet-of-everything (IoE) Devices

Abstract

As far as Internet-of-Everything (IoE) devices are concerned, strong security and low electromagnetic interference (EMI) are design requirements for power management to guarantee personal data protection. [1] is robust under power side-channel attacks (PSCA), but a power injection attack (PIA) results in limited random-number generation (RN), as shown in the upper left of Fig. 7.5.1. The loop randomization technique in [1] is cracked and vulnerable to PIA, since predictability and reproducibility arise in the linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Moreover, the PIA narrows the LFSR-based random switching frequency (f <inf xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">SW</inf> ) in [1] and reduces the triangular modulation frequency (f <inf xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">mod</inf> ) in [2] to around 1/N times of f <inf xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">sw</inf> . Consequently, the EMI noise floor fails to meet the specification of EN 55032 Class B, as shown in the upper right of Fig. 7.5.1. Other techniques offer counter measures to improve resistance against malicious attacks, but result in either increased power consumption [3] or large hardware overhead [4].