2017 · 34 citations · 19 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceComputer SecurityEmbedded SystemsSecurity ArchitectureEmbedded SecurityEmbedded System SecurityMicroarchitectural SecurityRoot Of TrustTrusted Platform ModulesAttestationDevice AttestationFormal ModelingHardware Root Of TrustHardware Roots Of TrustIndustrial Control SystemsIntegrityStride
For industrial control systems, ensuring the software integrity of their devices is a key security requirement. A pure software-based attestation solution is highly desirable for protecting legacy field devices that lack hardware root of trust (e.g., Trusted Platform Module). However, for the large population of field devices with ARM processors, existing software-based attestation schemes either incur long attestation time or are insecure. In this paper, we design a novel memory stride technique that significantly reduces the attestation time while remaining secure against known attacks and their advanced variants on ARM platform. We analyze the scheme's security and performance based on the formal framework proposed by Armknecht et al. [7] (with a necessary change to ensure its applicability in practical settings). We also implement memory stride on two models of real-world power grid devices that are widely deployed today, and demonstrate its superior performance.
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SWATT: software-based attestation for embedded devices
Abhijith Seshadri, Adrian Perrig, Leendert van Doorn et al. · 2004 · 701 citations
Jonathan M. McCune, Bryan Parno, Adrian Perrig et al. · 2008 · 646 citations
Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering +14
Arvind Seshadri, Mark Luk, Elaine Shi et al. · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · 2005 · 321 citations
Arvind Seshadri, Mark Luk, Adrian Perrig et al. · 2006 · 246 citations