Attractive carrots, bland sticks: organizational responses to regulatory policy in Argentine graduate education

Abstract

Most countries, developing as well as developed, have adopted some type of quality assurance mechanism. Argentina is neither an island nor an outlier in higher education reforms in general. This study is based on case study design and involved extensive fieldwork to collect interviews and official documents. This article analyzes the regulatory framework that established compulsory accreditation by identifying the main actors involved, the external factors that affect compliance, and university and program responses to them. The findings show that the regulatory framework is plagued by issues of coordination and overlap among agencies, affecting levels of compliance and types of responses at the organizational level. While the structure of incentives is clear, there are no clear sanctions or credible threats. Yet, programs tend to comply with accreditation. The study shows great variability among academic disciplines and types of programs. Findings are linked to developments in other developed and developing countries.