Journal of Small Business Management · 2016 · 27 citations · 48 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsFamily BusinessIndustrial OrganizationLabor EconomicsFamily Business GovernanceFamily ControlFamily EconomicsFamily Firm GovernanceFamily OrganizationFamily OwnershipFamily Business OwnershipFamily Governance StructureFamily Involvement In GovernanceFirm-level BargainingFirm-level Wage BargainingLabor ProductivityLabor Productivity EconomicsLabor Productivity Measurement
We investigate the role of Italian firms in labor productivity performance. We find that family-owned firms have lower labor productivity than their non-family counterparts. In a second step, we estimate the role of firm-level bargaining (FLB) to determine whether family-controlled firms that adopt this type of bargaining may partially close the gap in terms of labor productivity with their non-family competitors. Our results, obtained through IV estimation to control for endogeneity bias, suggest that enterprises under family governance achieve significant labor productivity gains—greater than those achieved by their non-family counterparts—when they adopt firm-level bargaining.
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