Intellectica Revue de l Association pour la Recherche Cognitive · 1997 · 185 citations · 0 references
HumanitiesPhilosophyPhysicsPhilosophy Of MindPhilosophy Of ScienceQuantum MechanicsEmergent BehaviorHistory Of SciencePhilosophy Of ChemistryPhilosophy Of PhysicsScientific RevolutionA Posteriori NecessityBondingEmergenceEmergent PropertiesPhilosophical InterpretationPhilosophical LiteraturePhysical Properties
This paper reviews the historical development of British Emergentism from Mill to Broad, noting that quantum mechanics and functionalism have prompted a redefinition of emergence. The paper investigates Van Cleve’s supervenience-based definition of emergent properties and proposes a criterion that, if mental properties arise from physical ones, reductive materialism is invalid, while leaving the actual emergence of properties as an open question. The authors propose a definition of emergent property based on supervenience, stipulating that if mental properties arise from physical ones, reductive materialism is invalid.
This paper presents a brief history of British Emergentism from Mill (1843) to Broad (1925). In the 20th century, the scientific revolution of quantum mechanics led to the reductive explanation of chemical bonding ; and the philosophical results of functionalism and a posteriori necessity also require a reformulation of the notion of emergence. The paper examines an attempt by Van Cleve (1990) to define the notion of an emergent property by appeal to supervenience. Finally, the paper proposes a definition of an emergent property such that if certain sorts of properties (e.g., mental properties) emerge from physical properties, then no version of reductive materialism is true. Whether any sort of property indeed emerges from physical properties will be left an open question.