Value Pluralism in Public Administration

Abstract

Traditional approaches to administrative ethics lament the absence of a comprehensive framework to guide research and practice. This article argues that the search for such a framework is achimera. Irresolvable value conflict, a condition that in moral philosophy is called value pluralism, is intrinsic to contemporary political and administrative life in liberal societies. The article argues that value pluralism should be the starting point of administrative ethics. The argument that is developed in the article is: 1) genuine value conflict in public administration is unavoidable. 2) Most of the public administration or policy literature dealing with ethical issues, frames value conflict in emotive, non-rational terms, and consequently opts for a deliberative approach to the resolution of value conflict. 3) This assumption is wrong and blinds us to the practical, interactive, discourse based conflict resolution that occurs in everyday administrative practice. Building on concrete examples of administrative value conflict, the author suggests a practice-oriented approach to value pluralism in public administration.