Ownership Holding by Second Largest Stockholder and Earnings Management

Wonsun Paek, Hyunwoo Cho

Jeung'gweon hag'hoeji · 2006 · 10 citations · 20 references

Concepts

Abstract

In a capital market which has a weak legal safeguard for external minority stockholders, it is highly likely that the bigger the largest stockholder’s equity holding is, the more probable its reported earnings are to be managed since the largest stockholder’s opportunistic behavior and incentives to infringe minor stockholder’s interests also increase in this situation of information asymmetry. On the other hand, for companies with more diversified ownership structures, the managers have incentives to manage reported earnings because they are under high pressure from the capital market. Yet, even though the largest stockholder’s equity holdings are huge, the manager’s incentive to engage in opportunistic behaviors will be limited when the second largest stockholders have a stronger monitoring role. In case the largest stockholder’s equity holdings are relatively small, manager’s opportunistic behavior is expected to be also limited if the second largest stockholders play an active monitoring role. In this regard, this study analyzes whether the largest stockholder’s equity holdings actually cause a firm to manage its earnings and whether this depends on a firm’s equity ownership structure. Especially, this study focuses on the second largest stockholder’s influence on the relation between the largest stockholder’s equity holdings and the managers’ incentive to adjust upward the earnings figures. First of all, it is hypothesized that: (1) the bigger the largest stockholder’s equity holdings become, the more likely a manager opportunistically increases the earnings; (2) earnings management is more prominent in manager-controlled companies than in owner-controlled companies; and (3) the bigger the

References

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