On the Presumed Fragility of Unconventional Beliefs

Abstract

Upon encountering an unconventional belief system, people are often heard to exclaim: How could anyone in his right mind believe such nonsense? This sentiment is not restricted to the layperson. A more subtle version of it is featured in some of the social scientific literature on religious cults an movements. As such, it gives rise to explanations of cult or movement viability that are premised on an assumption that unconventional religious beliefs are highly vulnerable to everyday experience and therefore inherently fragile. This assumption prompts some scholars to propose the existence of elaborate structures that are presumably required to maintain the tenuous beliefs and to protect their respective adherents from cognitive dissonance. This paper challenges the view that unconventional belief systems are necessarily fragile and owe their persistence primarily to the power of plausibility structures. It is also argued that such assumptions can function as barriers to understanding of contemporary religious movements and other unconventional beliefs.