The Unity of Descartes's Man

Abstract

One of the leading problems for Cartesian dualism is provide an account of the union of mind and body. This problem is often construed be one of explaining how thinking things and extended things can causally interact. That is, it needs be explained how thoughts in the mind can produce motions in the body and how motions in the body can produce sensations, appetites, and emotions in the mind. The conclusion often drawn, as it was by three of Descartes's illustrious successors, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, is that mind and body cannot causally interact.1 I mention this problem of the interaction between thinking things and extended things only distinguish it from the problem concerning the union of mind and body which I wish discuss. Some commentators, such as Daisie Radner, maintain that the union of mind and body is metaphysically more fundamental than their interaction and is meant account for the possibility of such interaction.2 But not everyone agrees that Descartes should or even can draw a distinction between the union of mind and body and their causal interaction. Margaret Wilson attributes Descartes a theory of mind-body union which she refers as the Natural Institution theory.3 According this theory, to conceive mind and body as united is just conceive of mind as subject, at a given time, experiencing certain sorts of sensations in response certain movements in the brain; and the brain as subject certain movements as a result of certain thoughts or volitions in the