Friends or foes? Interactions between Indonesia’s international investment agreements and national investment law

Jan Knörich, Axel Berger

2014 · 17 citations · 27 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Developing countries conclude international investment agreements to attract foreign investment, but these agreements impose extensive rules and allow investors to sue for compensation. The study argues that non‑compliance arises from inconsistencies between national investment laws and international treaty commitments and examines Indonesia’s law to identify strategies for greater coherence. The authors conduct an in-depth empirical analysis of Indonesia’s investment law to map its interaction with international investment agreements and propose governance mechanisms for coherence. The analysis shows that inconsistencies constrain national policy space and have implications for economic development.

Abstract

Developing countries regularly conclude international investment agreements with the objective of attracting foreign investment. Such agreements form commitments to far-reaching international rules on investment issues, and usually allow foreign investors to sue countries for compensation in cases of non-compliance with treaty provisions. This study argues that such non-compliance is a result of inconsistencies between national investment laws and measures and international treaty commitments. Through an in-depth empirical examination of Indonesia’s investment law, the study analyses the complexities of managing this interaction between national investment law and international investment agreements, and identifies appropriate strategies and governance mechanisms to enhance coherence between these two areas. The implications for national policy space and economic development are considered throughout.

References

27