The responsibility to protect after Libya and Syria

Spencer Zifcak

Melbourne journal of international law · 2012 · 111 citations · 0 references

Concepts

TL;DR

In 2005 the UN adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, assigning sovereign states the primary duty to prevent mass atrocities and granting the international community a duty to intervene when states fail, a principle that was tested during the 2011 Libyan conflict. This article analyzes the Libyan and Syrian cases to explain why international responses differed and what this reveals about the current practice of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The UN Security Council authorized NATO intervention in Libya but remained paralyzed over Syria, with neither sanctions nor military action agreed, highlighting inconsistencies in applying R2P.

Abstract

At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, global political leaders endorsed a new doctrine to govern international political behaviour entitled the 'responsibility to protect'. Pursuant to this doctrine, the nations of the world affirmed that the primary responsibility for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes rests with the sovereign state in which such crimes are anticipated or occurring. If, however, a state fails to exercise that responsibility, the international community may assume a corresponding duty to protect civilian populations from the commission of genocide and crimes against humanity. Only a short time later, in 2011, the international community was confronted with the prospect that large-scale civilian casualties may occur as a consequence of fighting between government and rebel forces in Libya. The UN Security Council, therefore, was confronted with the dilemma of whether to authorise an intervention to avert what seemed likely to be a humanitarian catastrophe. In this case, the UN Security Council sanctioned an intervention by NATO forces in accordance with the new doctrine. Soon after, the Syrian rebellion took hold and civilians began to be killed and injured in their thousands. In that case, however, the Security Council was paralysed. Neither sanctions nor military intervention could be agreed upon. In this article the Libyan and Syrian cases are analysed with a view to determining why the international community's response to the two conflicts has been so different and what these differences tell us about the current standing and practice of the responsibility to protect doctrine.