Mouse trap: exploiting firmware updates in USB peripherals

Jacob Maskiewicz, B. K. Ellis, James Mouradian, Hovav Shacham

2014 · 26 citations · 4 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Many users are unaware that malware can infect peripheral devices, and embedded devices often lack firmware‑update authentication, enabling malicious firmware infection. The study demonstrates that the Logitech G600 mouse can be weaponized to deliver malware to both networked and air‑gapped systems. The authors exploited the mouse’s firmware space to embed malware, transferred it to target machines via a custom utility, and later added bootloader signature verification to mitigate the attack. The attack enables persistent malware deployment on networked systems, and the authors show that bootloader signature verification effectively prevents malicious firmware installation.

Abstract

Although many users are aware of the threats that malware pose, users are unaware that malware can infect peripheral devices. Many embedded devices support firmware update capabilities, yet they do not authenticate such updates; this allows adversaries to infect peripherals with malicious firmware. We present a case study of the Logitech G600 mouse, demonstrating attacks on networked systems which are also feasible against airgapped systems.\n\nIf the target machine is air-gapped, we show that the Logitech G600 has enough space available to host an entire malware package inside its firmware. We also wrote a file transfer utility that transfers the malware from the mouse to the target machine. If the target is networked, the mouse can be used as a persistent threat that updates and reinstalls malware as desired. To mitigate these attacks, we implemented signature verification code which is essential to preventing malicious firmware from being installed on the mouse. We demonstrate that it is reasonable to include such signature verification code in the bootloader of the mouse.

References

4