Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents

Abstract

There is a growing literature arguing that certain entities embodied by groups of agents—certain “collectives”—themselves qualify as agents; even, some say, as moral agents.1 These are ambitious claims. To be agents, such entities must be capable of acting on the basis of their own beliefs, desires, and intentions. To be moral agents, subject to moral obligations and accountable for their actions, they should presumably also be capable of acting freely in some relevant sense, and of recognizing and acting on moral considerations, including the respect owed to others. In addition to this, it might seem that to be fully fledged moral agents—fitting targets of a wide range of moral assessments and reactions—they must be capable of certain reactive attitudes, in particular those of guilt and indignation.2 Such agents must be able to understand when they have done wrong, and that they are accountable for their actions. At least in non-parasitic cases, this arguably involves not only grasping that guilt would be a fitting attitude on their part, and indignation a fitting attitude on the part of others, but also a capacity for guilt and indignation.3 Relatedly, one might think that fully morally accountable agents must be capable of holding themselves responsible, which might seem to essentially involve the ability to feel guilty about what one has done.4 While there has been much debate over the possibility that collectives are capable of relevant beliefs and desires, and some about whether they can be appropriately free and responsible,5 there has been little discussion of the possibility that collectives are capable of reactive attitudes. Partly, this might be because the idea that fully fledged moral agency requires a capacity for reactive attitudes is comparatively controversial. But the idea has become widely enough endorsed to raise questions about its consequences for collective moral agency and responsibility. These questions are particularly pressing as the idea seems to straightforwardly rule out fully fledged collective moral agency. For it might seem thoroughly implausible that collectives can feel guilt and in that sense hold themselves responsible, or have the corresponding practical understanding of the demands of morality that we expect from human agents.6 It is of course obvious that the members of a collective can possess reactive attitudes, and that in many cases their reactive attitudes derive from their membership in the collective. Members are often ashamed, proud, or indignant about things their collective has done, or about things that have been done to it, regardless of their own participation or lack thereof in the event.7 Similarly, members might jointly intend or be jointly committed to feel remorse, or to express regret on the part of the collective.8 But our concern is different. If a collective is to qualify as an agent in its own right, it must have its own beliefs, desires, intentions, and free actions; it is not enough that its members are capable of such states and activities. Just so, if a collective is to qualify as a fully fledged moral agent in its own right, and if fully fledged moral agency requires the capacity for reactive attitudes, that collective must be capable of its own reactive attitudes. It must itself be capable of guilt and indignation. We argue below that, contrary to what one might think, at least certain collectives are. Or, more precisely, we argue that if certain collectives are capable of agency, then they are also capable of states sufficiently similar to guilt and indignation to satisfy the requirements of moral agency. Their expressions of indignation need not be mere strategic aggression, and their expressions of guilt and sorrow for what they have done need not be mere crocodile tears. The plan is as follows. In section 2, we explain why one might think that certain collectives—which we designate as “corporate agents”—can have their own equivalents of beliefs, desires, and intentions, distinct from the beliefs, desires, and intentions of their members, and how they might be capable of moral cognition, motivation, and free action on the basis of those intentional states.9 Our purpose here is not to convince the skeptical reader that these corporate agents—typified by the modern corporation—have these capacities; have at for this we to the of that we as we argue similar that corporate agents are also capable of equivalents of reactive attitudes. The in is to beliefs, and for and free action in argue that it is such states that are for agency, and that the corresponding can be in entities We then this to the of guilt and indignation in moral agency. In section we the such attitudes that seem to fully fledged moral agency, and in section we argue that such this, and that the in section is fully fledged moral agency is the of if such agency requires the capacity for equivalents of reactive In section we some consequences of this We that some might this as a of a understanding of moral this in itself has For others, it questions about how moral would to corporate agents or to such agents, and about the for or some about the and and they by which they those in those often those in the of or and and and of they are sufficiently that the of the members corporate in those corporate and regardless of whether members or are of can and and that not that of their members, and they which that the members those in of those regardless of or contrary It is this the possibility of a and corporate that from It is also a by a of entities that are in and of the and the modern as of this we these entities “corporate For we also of corporate agents as the of the corporate one might our that corporate agents are more or a of in a certain We to that it is not that there be such often the of the corporate agent to which they because members corporate and because the We on the because that often the of when corporate the corporate agent and the members that or that is to that these distinct intentional and that the can be by the here in corporate are distinct from and this regardless of whether they or For a of a corporate the a of is committed to is is a to and and to its are by its has a plan to a because the is to be and the in an If the of the out to be we would not be if the plan to or qualify its if the out to be and we would not be if it and it a more In in an its and to more to that and much as we expect of a human It is the of such corporate that to least of corporate agents as entities are in and by their about how the what to and how to about and we might While we this of in of obvious that members have in the and it is to a that the of the We more about in the of the For to that the might it is not the that we can for of The has the of and is not to the members have the of or the have and It is a corporate agent a a or a to and that its members for of have the of our to this is if certain about about members, it not be a the is more as as members the by these corporate and or at to the in an in of regardless of its about these much should be and the are we think that from this of about agency, and and about and and how to on to beliefs, desires, and intentions as as agency is we might are about the of the and about what in the that are to in the and they in these of a not or they in they can be In they a of about and that corporate what a of of from which involve a of own and to of the that and it a on the basis of this of not or at more human it in a on the basis of a of the that when members on the basis of their is by collective is corporate that are not and but and at the collective these are are not the of the members, of It be that members these is the is to be it be that members there is a of and many members, and many of have about these at when members as members, they in that are by these corporate they so, It seem implausible to that from the of its members, it is that concern can in a of of which are to be in in a corporate agent of We one such here then it and in more in section in our of a corporate agent its own reactive The we have in is fully the the the attitude is the of the and the a While the members are in the the not the own for that in these cases, members not express their own the are they they their from the of of the corporate to to and from these members that to a also that this should be done in that are of the but that to and are more to and In this a a or in an and the of this requires from the members about the or of or the they need to be and have about the to the to the of in the to the members to it their own to is one by which the that the is its members The members from not from their and express its own those of its In this the corporate can a or an one the of the in and for that might have little to its beliefs and those is what we when we that corporate agents can possess their own equivalents beliefs and desires, distinct from the beliefs and of their they possess their own about and which need have to their about those and is by these corporate the from to moral agency, it is how this moral and moral Just as a to be responsible, it might to and or more to in a morally then on members, or to whether its these and In is capable of moral and of action by such on what a its can express to or It is how a corporate agent might freely in for it to be responsible, at least on are to a of including morally relevant and in from its own equivalents beliefs, and intentions. These not been by that the of or has about its own as we have the capacity to to on certain and others. of this, is much the agent is or and by might that is by its members in that its responsibility. there is that members a in the by which its and its Similarly, there is that the members themselves to their to the demands of But we have that these that of or are It is that and on and are the of its the can be of an human and also on and are or as as the in which these and are and by and Just so, the that and not or as as the in which they is and by own If there is a concern here about and it would be one that on free and moral and might when we on in which human and action is by on a our here is whether there is corporate in we this concern to the of corporate reactive attitudes, we to one of about corporate agency. corporate agents can by agency is often not only but also But how there be is for a corporate agent to or there be a of to the of In this things should be in The is that corporate agents might often For one of the that is to is to the and of from including the To the that this is for it seems to would out that corporate agents are capable of For of about and might be jointly to the corporate and to its such is to and from the and and a of its members about the and relevant to The is that for our what is not whether corporate agents can have a of but whether they can have what it to be morally we can how the of might be for the and for but we to why of a of would If corporate agents can of the things they subject to there is for the to or human agents these to be in their own they are not for moral agency. In what we that to the that a of is for it is one that a corporate agent in Our concern is if corporate agents have the to from their own in the they can also have the moral reactive attitudes. We have why it might be to agency to can be in states to beliefs, and intentions in human We have also why one might think that are capable of moral and motivation, including or and satisfy for free they can on the basis of their own The is whether we have to reactive attitudes, to the that such are for moral responsibility. In arguing that we have such our is to reactive attitudes in the of and that they to and the of that to and then to of these that might be as for moral responsibility. that these can be in and that can equivalents of beliefs, desires, and intentions, we that it is at least for to states similar to and to these To this is the of the But the mere possibility of corporate moral equivalents to reactive attitudes is not enough to sense of or of holding morally and as fully fledged moral In the we argue that we can expect to be capable of such We to be that our here is not to the of the relevant reactive attitudes. out how reactive attitudes states such might be for fully fledged moral agency and of that the one some of guilt and might be for moral on the some for moral agency might be these attitudes, part of their for it not whether is in such as and as certain and from of these as of such or whether the should be those or Similarly, it not whether we the and indignation guilt an to or a of or for our is whether there are or that are reactive attitudes, for fully fledged moral agency, and to For this we a of that seem indignation and be to and on the and to one in as our here has not been to or for indignation or but to to that can be as for fully fledged moral agency. for our is not whether corporate agents are capable of these but whether they are capable of moral equivalents of these these we think that they of the guilt and indignation in of holding and and to of moral they out of guilt and indignation that have a particularly in from and expressions of indignation are as to or lack of on part of its they are as demands that the agent respect certain is not only by but one to of action and in cases to the that the has not its attitude the relevant or guilt and its expressions seem to be what is of the in expressions of indignation. It the guilty to its of and on the of its lack of sense of the that targets of indignation and corresponding of holding be capable of only when the guilt can the demands of indignation be in the agent is capable of moral sense and understand reactive in a that and to moral considerations, and also an and of as distinct from for these demands and the agent this capacity not be able to these to and of have agents are in this are lack capacity to feel in of or the of reactive in moral is that they a of and distinct from or strategic to and in the agent capable of guilt can the of indignation not only but also and agent this capacity can that is for but not have practical for in the it would for fully fledged moral agents a moral of indignation arguably lack a practical understanding of moral is that human agents, are of the and and by one might think, be by their own only by about that such a agent might on as one in the of guilt the by the and to the moral so, this agent seems to lack an part of the moral capacity of human it can have some of moral and be the of certain of moral but in of by of its it at least at a to of fully fledged moral the have moral a in on morally of a or in the of those In cases, of moral and guilt and indignation are by and to or those or moral as moral seem to and to moral our practical on those when for The here is that lack sufficiently these and their moral might whether guilt and indignation involve or the or but as we have this is not what what is whether the are for fully fledged moral agency and whether can have might also debate the to which of moral agency are such the that these are for of moral have a a discussion of whether they might be in corporate is the of the we should one The is that attitudes guilt and indignation are to a certain and that corporate agents be of such a We have a similar to the of corporate beliefs, desires, intentions, and free action in the of a in the But the might seem in the of guilt and for guilt and indignation are often as and are more as essentially to a certain are beliefs, desires, intentions, and free it might seem that and is done by the of guilt and it is the of guilt or indignation that out strategic and the agent on the relevant moral the of guilt might seem to its in of holding of the of expressions of indignation seem not to have been the guilty is by the of of and to and to are not we think that the is is not whether corporate agents can be human agents, but whether they can have the for fully fledged moral agency. In the we that agency might that about the agent and its be widely to the and of an are We also that corporate agents are capable of the relevant of The of fully fledged moral agency might and and reactive attitudes and their we to think that the of the of reactive attitudes or that things of guilt and indignation might not the or in corporate it to the that guilt must be to the of we to that it is for fully fledged moral agency. agent has the relevant and is an of indignation. But more can be we that seems particularly relevant as a for indignation because it is and that the agent has a to an the moral of guilt as be of a that it is to The is that the in that such an is to and in part on those a that the is to to the that it is committed to the as we can this and of an can satisfy the of indignation as as In the section we some of the by which corporate agents can and their for moral equivalents to guilt and in the of a of that, the to the to explain what for to that guilt and indignation might in fully fledged moral agency, what is to that corporate agents are capable of these capable of for our are of guilt and indignation. we have it is not to that the members of corporate agents can be guilty or to on our that the corporate agent is a moral such must be to the corporate agent on the we can how this might be the that has fully the and is to one a of that its has in the to are and and there is a an of its own and this that the have The the the for the not certain that would have of the and that the has been more it to the and to the that is for the on the it the that it is for It has the that it is for The and for their they to the of and it is that action the of its members in their as on the that it is for the and and on by its members, including about what of are when one is for the for and the and a to and the that to the and to the the of the to we an on and not a a a action and and a to the and lack of concern for In at the corporate things about this of of this can of that wrong, or that itself of think that this is an that not what it is has been or that the not the or that the not to the of or that they themselves not to that in and their own members feel guilt guilt on but of course fully capable of and in its own There is acting on this and acting on that the would be it is that many their to be more to their members by the become more need not be or a on they are more of more more reactive to members or these as they In this attitude out of the of and in to in the intentions to more The these are or the more they of a at from guilt over the of the has its and of the might be as and as human to For might and because is that this is what one when one is for when it some if to for its an to the of and if of and a in the are and its and for be of strategic is about human if strategic are part of the or for our to and if and the some in how we on such what is an or an to a can be the mere that we are for the In cases, it is the of that action on to to and to and to not the that it would be If these are by of guilt in the human they might be by of the that are and corporate these can its members on morally relevant and by on the that it to its members on and and can more an practical understanding of and are at to the moral has These members the for in the that can the for or that for in and that are by moral can its in or on its to its in the such and and its In these we think that a corporate agent has moral of the things can be about indignation. that their and that is for the to this is the and that in an to responsibility. In to this, might the that it is and that has to the on and in it in of its its and its it the of its for the and the of as to its responsibility. as in the of these might be and of whether members of think that is or that in If what we have in this section is corporate agents can appropriately and to in which they themselves to be or and from states morally to guilt and of corresponding guilt or indignation on the part of their on to our we would to one The that reactive attitudes are for moral agency is part of a of what is in the of moral that involves a of the moral It is the of this to that in but we to it and an a of the moral requires the possibility of holding and responsible, and it seem that corporate agents are not capable of this of is of course often on and and it is that can be indignant about from such entities and express such indignation in and at these and also that to such in that by human agents, as in the of But one might that the of such in of it is to be is in some or of in the In one might think that the must the or the as these the of we think, is a but not one that should the in this We of the one might feel that moral at a to at some of its has only been fully and when it has been and in in attitude and from might that this is the not the But this is not at a human moral agent have been only when it has in those of that are for agent and and when this has to a in We would not from this that the those the human agent as a Just so, we should not that the the corporate agent as a one might also feel that if the or members of the are for some morally action by the then the itself also be responsible, and be by reactive attitudes. But if to or if and they are often for what is that corporate agents can satisfy requirements of fully fledged moral agency, it is why and particular members of its in some cases, as might have on their own morally We have that if a can be a free agent in its own right, then it can also have and that are guilt and indignation and relevant for moral and fully fledged moral agency. The to this our that what reactive attitudes to fully fledged moral agency is not some but certain and Such we have can be by In this we have an for the of corporate Our here can be to be If an of that can that there is corporate agency, then such an can also that corporate agents can have moral equivalents of reactive attitudes. the of this implausible might our to the of the of corporate agency. But if one the and to the our a explain why the of that corporate agency not to reactive attitudes, in of what we have that our is It then to to that have for moral agency and the of corporate For that moral agency might the capacity to for or about the moral of actions, but that lack this it seems that a moral agent must in some sense be capable of such we to from is is that a fully fledged moral agent be capable of recognizing morally relevant of a including the of relevant of such as the of own actions, agents, or the to these and to in and of when recognizing that has not to these We it that the possibility of these of has been in and that these are in we not why feel of such would for fully fledged We have the of as a and we that similar might be about a many If that is right, it one of the to think that reactive attitudes distinct from particular are can equivalents guilt or to of often in to expressions of indignation and on the part of and it is that not corporate agents have the relevant in or have in to the But more human agents for moral corporate agents can often such and to and moral at the corporate when the are or expressions of strategic sense, as can corporate agents to and of the we have fully fledged moral we would be if we to some of the of our claims. if one the that some are fully fledged moral agents, one might to that they have moral obligations not to or in the of the idea that have moral that it is to their and that, as it, of is to its is to precisely, the of those obligations might and the whether the should to the moral of corporate agents, and whether for should more for The of in and more corporate is of the possibility and of such questions about for of in arguing that are moral agents we have the possibility that they also qualify as moral they are morally and that their should in a moral might that we are committed to that because the of moral agents and moral are While we that our to that we this But it is that the concern respect to We can that in on those of At what they become moral agents as that moral or morally and our or to and The that corporate agents can have intentions and and the the intentions of corporate agents and the intentions of their members, have for the of in corporate the of the for moral agency might that qualify as and are to wide when the that are to certain free what been of our might be to that corporate agents are and should be as While we express on the of these and we that the we have done here be of in