The revival of the nation-state? Stock exchange regulation in an era of globalized financial markets

Susanne Lütz

Journal of European Public Policy · 1998 · 150 citations · 28 references

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TL;DR

Economic globalization erodes state power, as market actors exploit deterritorialization to seek low‑regulation environments, leaving nation‑states with diminished autonomy. The article argues that economic internationalization weakens self‑binding agreements and interstate cooperation, thereby imposing new supervisory duties on nation‑states. The authors analyze the German stock exchange sector’s transformation as an empirical case illustrating the nation‑state’s enhanced governance role. The transformation of the German stock exchange sector strengthened the nation‑state’s role in sectoral governance.

Abstract

ABSTRACT The debate on economic globalization suggests that the blurring of territorial boundaries shifts the power relations between nation-states and domestic market constituencies in favour of the latter. States have lost autonomy since policies are increasingly formulated in supranational or global arenas. Market actors seem to profit from economic and political deterritorialization. They may use their wider choice of geographic location in order to lobby for low regulated market environments. The article seeks to differentiate this common view considerably. It argues that economic internationalization tends to erode the legitimacy of self-binding agreements that had formerly solved regulatory problems. Networks of interstate collaboration in turn lack the ability to monitor and enforce negotiated agreements. Both developments impose new duties of market supervision on the nation-state. Empirical reference is drawn from the German stock exchange sector that underwent a process of fundamental transformation leading to an enhanced role of the nation-state in the model of sectoral governance.

References

28