Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China

Abstract

Leaders use both coercion and engagement as leverage against other nations. Recent literature suggests economic sanctions are more effective than deployed sanctions to attain intended foreign policy goals. This paper examines a case of threatened coercion—the threat to remove China's most favored nation (MFN) status following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989—where engagement would have produced better human rights in China. We show that the American threats to sanction China were counterproductive, while cooperative statements and MFN renewal proved to have a more beneficial impact on Beijing's human rights policies. This paper suggests that economic sanction threats are not directly linked to China's human rights behaviors. Instead, China uses accommodations to manipulate diplomatic relations with the U.S. As a result, engagement with China would have been a more productive policy when dealing with human rights issues.