From the Revolution to Embodiment

TLDR

The 1988 cognitive revolution framed cognition as abstract symbol manipulation, yet its ideas were becoming stale, prompting questions about action, self, and the emerging view that cognition depends on bodily action. The authors aim to integrate cognition with emotions, social psychology, development, and clinical analyses by characterizing the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary cognitive psychology and outlining embodied cognition. They describe embodied cognition as a dynamic interplay where the brain directs bodily action, which shapes perception and in turn modifies the brain, emphasizing how action informs perception, self, and language. They argue that centering the body in action within cognitive theories can help unify psychology.

Abstract

In 1988, the cognitive revolution had become institutionalized: Cognition was the manipulation of abstract symbols by rules. But, much like institutionalized political parties, some of the ideas were becoming stale. Where was action? Where was the self? How could cognition be smoothly integrated with emotions, with social psychology, with development, with clinical analyses? Around that time, thinkers in linguistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, biology, and psychology were formulating the idea that just as overt behavior depends on the specifics of the body in action, so might cognition depend on the body. Here we characterize (some would say caricature) the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive psychology of that era, and then we describe what has come to be called embodied cognition: how cognition arises through the dynamic interplay of brain controlling bodily action controlling perception, which changes the brain. We focus on the importance of action and how action shapes perception, the self, and language. Having the body in action as a central consideration for theories of cognition promises, we believe, to help unify psychology.