The Journal of Finance · 2005 · 99 citations · 34 references
ManagementBusiness EconomicsCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceCorporate LitigationAgency CostsDispute ResolutionLitigation ManagementManagerial OpportunismShareholder LitigationTransaction Cost EconomicsAgency Conflicts Between ShareholdersAgency Cost EffectsCorporate Governance LitigationManagement OpportunismOpportunism In Contracting
ABSTRACT Using a large sample of litigation events involving publicly listed defendants, we document a surprising fact. The resolution of litigation through a court's decision dominates settlement of litigation from the shareholders' point of view, even when the firm loses. We develop a model using agency costs within the firm to explain why the market views settlement as a negative outcome on average and find empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. Specifically, firms with weak corporate governance settle litigation more quickly, and the market reacts more negatively to settlements involving firms with higher agency costs.
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Michael C. Jensen · American Economic Review · 1986 · 17.6K citations
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Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · Journal of Political Economy · 1986 · 8.6K citations