Real Estate Economics · 1998 · 25 citations · 9 references
BusinessEconomicsReal EstateContract TheoryHousingReal Estate FinanceAdverse SelectionCredit RiskHousing FinanceMoral HazardRental HousingRental MarketsAdverse Selection PricingAsymmetric Information ExchangeAsymmetric Information In RentingBargaining With Asymmetric InformationCredit Market Adverse SelectionLandlord BehaviorMoral Hazard AnalysisRental Payments
This article examines the pricing of rental contracts for two types of renter households: those who are able to amass a large, up‐front security deposit and those with little, or no, security to offer. Empirical tests are presented to suggest that, in dealing with renter households who have little, or no, security to offer, landlords earn at a similar rate of return as lenders who make riskier loans at a high interest rate to borrowers of dubious credit. The analysis suggests that this situation occurs in large part because of the problem of asymmetric information and moral hazard between landlords and renter households regarding the latter's use of the premises.
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A Model of Housing Tenure Choice
J. Vernon Henderson, Yannis M. Ioannides · American Economic Review · 1983 · 686 citations
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