Publication | Closed Access
Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86
502
Citations
40
References
1989
Year
DemocracyPublic PolicyAggregate Time-series DataSmart VotingPolitical EquilibriumElection ForecastingElectionsStrategic Political ElitesPolitical GamePolitical ProcessU.s. House ElectionsPolitical BehaviorPolitical PartiesPostwar House ElectionsPolitical CompetitionPolitical ScienceSocial Sciences
The growing importance of strategic politicians parallels the shift toward candidate‑centered electoral politics. Strategic political elites translate national conditions into House election outcomes, with high‑quality candidates running and winning more when prospects favor their party, thereby reflecting and amplifying partisan tides and weakening the automatic enforcement of collective responsibility.
Analysis of both district-level and aggregate time-series data from postwar House elections supports the thesis that strategic political elites play a pivotal role in translating national conditions into election results and therefore in holding members of Congress collectively accountable for the government's performance. More high-quality candidates run when prospects appear to favor their party; they also win significantly more votes and victories than other candidates in equivalent circumstances. Thus, strategic career decisions both reflect and enhance national partisan tides. The electoral importance of strategic politicians has grown over time in tandem with the trend toward candidate-centered electoral politics. This has rendered the effects of national forces less automatic, more contingent, thus threatening the capacity of elections to enforce some degree of collective responsibility.
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