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Lower Bounds for the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants
45
Citations
9
References
1990
Year
EngineeringComputational Social ChoiceStable MarriageSocial MatchingMatching TechniqueLower BoundCombinatorial DesignExtremal Set TheoryComputational ComplexityExtremal CombinatoricsProblem InstanceDiscrete MathematicsCombinatorial OptimizationGraph MatchingMechanism DesignStable Marriage Problem
In an instance of the stable marriage problem of size n, n men and n women, each participant ranks members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable marriage is a complete matching $M = \{ (m_{1}, w_{i_{1}}), (m_{2}, w_{i_{2}}),\cdots, (m_{n}, w_{i_{n}})\}$ such that no unmatched man and woman prefer each other to their partners in M. There exists an efficient algorithm, due to Gale and Shapley, that finds a stable marriage for any given problem instance. A pair $(m_{i} w_{j})$ is stable if it is contained in some stable marriage. In this paper, the problem of determining whether an arbitrary pair is stable in a given problem instance is studied. It is shown that the problem has a lower bound of $\Omega (n^{2})$ in the worst case. Hence, a previous known algorithm for the problem is asymptotically optimal. As corollaries of these results, the lower bound of $\Omega (n^{2})$ is established for several stable marriage related problems. Knuth, in his treatise on stable marriage, asks if there is an algorithm that finds a stable marriage in less than $\Theta (n^{2})$ time. The results in this paper show that such an algorithm does not exist.
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