Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities

TLDR

Recent research shows that major publicly traded family‑controlled businesses outperform other firms, overturning earlier views of them as obsolete and problematic. The study seeks to explain why some family businesses perform well while others do poorly. The authors analyze four governance dimensions—ownership level and mode, family leadership, breadth of family involvement, and generational participation—using agency and stewardship theory to link them to resource allocation, capability development, and financial performance. They propose drivers that enable some family businesses to become strong competitors while others remain disadvantaged.

Abstract

After decades of being viewed as obsolete and problem ridden, recent research has begun to show that major, publicly traded family-controlled businesses (FCBs) actually out-perform other types of businesses. This article examines the nature of such family businesses in an attempt to explain why some seem to do so well and others so poorly. It begins with four fundamental governance choices that distinguish among different kinds of family businesses: level and mode of family ownership, family leadership, the broader involvement of multiple family members, and the planned or actual participation of later generations. Using precepts from agency and stewardship theory, it relates these dimensions to the nature of the resource-allocation decisions made by the business and capability development, which in turn have implications for financial performance. Propositions are drawn about the drivers that make some family businesses great competitors—while leaving others at a disadvantage.