Disaggregation, autonomy and re-regulation, contractualism

Abstract

Abstract The spread of semi-autonomous organizations for the execution of public functions has attracted academic interest. There seem to be two main research agendas, one investigating broad issues of autonomy and control of Non-Departmental Public Bodies, another one focused on the narrower phenomenon of executive agencies. Especially the latter may benefit from the operationalization of commonly used concepts like: disaggregation, autonomy and re-regulation, contractualism. The article adopts an analytical framework based on these concepts to investigate executive agencies in Italy. Findings of interest for the international scholarly debate include: the limitations to the consideration of contractualism as an autonomous unit of analysis; the influence of the politico-administrative context on the actual utilization of performance contracting; the (apparently limited) role of re-regulation, and its sensitivity to the context; the importance of considering a wide range of factors in a combined way in explaining agency form; the consideration that ‘modern’ agencies are varied and not standardized solutions; the limitations that apply to the use of the so-called ‘tripod’ model of agency.