The Review of Symbolic Logic · 2014 · 69 citations · 20 references
Natural SciencesPhilosophyLogicProbability TheorySemanticsConditional ProbabilityDecision-making Under UncertaintyEvidence TheoryIntuitive Decision-makingProbabilistic LogicProbabilistic SemanticsTotal Evidence AnalysisWorld Semantics
Abstract In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker’s thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by ‘if A then B ’ in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised rigorously and two models are provided that demonstrate that the new thesis is indeed tenable within a standard possible world semantics based on selection functions. Unlike the Stalnaker–Lewis semantics the selection functions cannot be understood in terms of similarity. A probabilistic account of selection is defended in its place. I end the paper by suggesting that this approach overcomes some of the objections often levelled at accounts of indicatives based on the notion of similarity.
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Choice Reviews Online · 2015 · 5.3K citations
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy
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Dorothy Edgington · Mind · 1995 · 586 citations
Robert Stalnaker · Philosophy of Science · 1970 · 341 citations
Robert Stalnaker · Philosophia · 1975 · 339 citations