China Journal of Accounting Research · 2015 · 17 citations · 24 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryContract TheoryCorporate FinanceAgency CostsCorporate Governance MechanismsDeferred CompensationExecutive Compensation OversightShareholder-manager ConflictsCeo OversightCompensation Contract DesignIncentive MechanismsManagerial Incentive Contracts
This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.
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Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
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