Regulation & Governance · 2010 · 189 citations · 49 references
Public AffairsNonprofit ManagementPublic AdministrationAgency TheoryInstitutional TheoryOrganizationsAccountabilityAgency CostsNon-governmental OrganizationsNonprofit OrganizationsRegulatory AgenciesAccountability In Nonprofit OrganizationsInstitutional ModelsInternal Agency GovernancePrincipal-agent AccountabilityPrincipal-agent Arrangements
The article investigates how information problems can lead to agency slippages and governance failures in nonprofits, and how voluntary regulation programs serve as signals of proper resource use. The authors propose voluntary regulation programs as a principal–agent mechanism that imposes internal governance and resource‑use obligations, potentially reducing agency slippages and encouraging principals to provide resources, and they outline an analytical framework to distinguish credible clubs from charity washes. Regulatory programs for nonprofits vary in quality and can sometimes obscure information rather than reveal it.
Abstract In this article we examine how information problems can cause agency slippages and lead to governance failures in nonprofit organizations. Drawing on the principal–agent literature, we provide a theoretical account of an institutional mechanism, namely, voluntary regulation programs, to mitigate such slippages. These programs seek to impose obligations on their participants regarding internal governance and use of resources. By joining these programs, nonprofit organizations seek to differentiate themselves from nonparticipants and signal to their principals that they are deploying resources as per the organizational mandate. If principals are assured that agency slippages are lower in program participants, they might be more likely to provide the participants with resources to deliver goods and services to their target populations. However, regulatory programs for nonprofit organizations are of variable quality and, in some cases, could be designed to obscure rather than reveal information. We outline an analytical framework to differentiate the credible clubs from the “charity washes.” A focus on the institutional architecture of these programs can help to predict their efficacy in reducing agency problems.
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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The Logic of Collective Action.
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