International Organization · 1999 · 250 citations · 47 references
Social SciencesHistoryPolitical ScienceEuropean HistoryInstitutional TheoryPolitical HistoryEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean PoliticsEuropean Union InstitutionsEuropean Union StudiesVoting RulesEuropean RelationsEuropean Union DemocracyEuropean Union Legislative PoliticsEuropean Union Policy-makingEuropean Union PoliticsMajority VotingMajority Voting SystemsState-dependent Preferences
European Community scholarship has long examined how formal voting rules and institutional reforms shape decision‑making, with the dominant view that the EC was paralyzed until reforms in 1987 and 1992 restored majority voting and accelerated legislation. The study tests the assumption that the EC was paralyzed before reforms and that reforms facilitated decision making, using comprehensive data from 1974–1995. Event‑history analysis of EC legislative activity from 1974 to 1995 is employed to assess the impact of voting rules and institutional reforms. The analysis shows that the 1970s EC was not paralyzed, the Luxembourg Compromise was overstated, reforms hindered rather than facilitated legislation, and institutional effects are mediated by member‑state preference distributions, underscoring the relevance of standard political science theories to European integration.
Scholarship on the European Community (EC) focuses particular attention on how formal voting rules and institutional reform condition decision-making outcomes. The predominant view of EC history holds that decision making remained paralyzed until institutional reforms in 1987 and 1992 restored and expanded adherence to majority voting rules, which in turn unblocked and expedited EC legislative efforts. In this study I challenge these fundamental assumptions using comprehensive data for 1974–95 and a series of quantitative assessments, including event history analysis. I show that decision making in the 1970s was anything but paralyzed, that the impact of the Luxembourg Compromise has been greatly overstated, that institutional reforms actually encumbered rather than eased the EC legislative process, and that institutional effects are mediated by the underlying distribution of member state preferences. The findings have important implications for our understanding of the history and future trajectory of European integration and highlight the applicability of standard political science theories and methods to the study of the EC.
47