Economica · 2016 · 334 citations · 64 references
Public AffairsAccountancyPublic FinanceFiscal PolicyTax PolicyTaxationTax AuditsTax EnforcementTax EvasionTax Information ReportingTax PenaltiesTax ReportingAuditsEndogenous Growth ModelEnforcementPenaltiesTax Audit CoverageTax Audit PenaltiesTax Policy Reporting
We develop an agency model explaining why third‐party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful. While third‐party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees, collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion. We embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development, showing that the tax take evolves as an S‐shape driven by changes in third‐party information. We show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development.
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Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Gary S. Becker · Journal of Political Economy · 1968 · 13.3K citations
Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth
Robert J. Barro · Journal of Political Economy · 1990 · 6.3K citations · Full text
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Michael Allingham, Agnar Sandmo · Journal of Public Economics · 1972 · 4.9K citations
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