Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case

TLDR

The Asia‑Pacific region shows low legalization of regional institutions, prompting debate over whether economic integration drives legalization amid recent institutional developments and the Asian economic crisis. Analysis of ASEAN, APEC, and the ARF shows that regional institution building occurs without legalization, indicating that legalization is driven by economic integration demands and strategic government responses rather than domestic legal culture or sovereignty costs. ASEAN has adopted a legalized dispute‑settlement mechanism, while the ARF and APEC resist clear legal obligations and third‑party dispute resolution.

Abstract

The Asia-Pacific region offers an example of low legalization of regional institutions and perhaps an explicit aversion to legalization. An examination of three key regional institutions—ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum)—confirms a regional process of institution building without legalization. Recent developments in these institutions permit some discrimination among competing explanations for low legalization. On the one hand, ASEAN has embraced a legalized dispute-settlement mechanism; Asian governments have also employed legalized global institutions. On the other hand, the ARF and APEC continue to resist clear-cut legal obligations and third-party dispute resolution. This pattern suggests that legalization is best viewed as driven by the demands of economic integration and as a strategic response by governments in particular institutional settings. These explanations undermine alternatives based on domestic legal culture and uniformly high sovereignty costs. The Asian economic crisis has reopened a debate over regional institutions, which may fix on legalization as part of a new regional institutional design.