Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

George E. Newman, Julian De Freitas, Joshua Knobe

Cognitive Science · 2014 · 209 citations · 43 references

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TL;DR

Prior work has shown that moral judgments create asymmetries in beliefs about an individual’s values, happiness, willpower, and deserved praise or blame, yet the origins of these asymmetries remain unclear. The study investigates whether beliefs about an agent’s true self explain these observed asymmetries. The authors argue that the belief in a true self leads people to attribute different mental states—values, happiness, willpower, and deservedness—to the agent. Five experiments using prior materials demonstrate that people tend to believe a true self inside each individual urges morally virtuous behavior, and that this belief accounts for the observed asymmetries, thereby informing debates on how moral values shape non‑moral beliefs.

Abstract

Abstract Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.

References

43