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Coalition Trading in Spain: Explaining State-wide Parties' Government Formation Strategies at the Regional Level
37
Citations
32
References
2013
Year
Political BehaviorCoalition GameSocial SciencesPolitical EquilibriumPolitical GamePolitical EconomyExplaining State-wide PartiesPolitical SystemPublic PolicyEconomicsComparative PoliticsRegional PolicyCoalition FormationPolitical CompetitionGovernment Formation StrategiesSpanish PoliticsPolitical GeographyCoalition TradingPolitical PartiesPolitical Science
In compounded polities, political parties need to co-ordinate their governing strategies across the central and the regional tiers of government. The coalition game is also more complex in these contexts, especially for the state-wide parties (SWP) that alternate in central office, as their need for cohesiveness across party levels is higher and the quest for vertical congruence across institutional levels is more pressing. This article aims at identifying the influence of the SWP situation at the central level on their government formation strategies at the regional level. By examining the Spanish case, we show that multi-level dynamics provide parties with incentives to trade government formation strategies at different levels. Particularly, when the SWP in the central government has a minority status, parliamentary support is more likely to be given to the investiture of non-state-wide parties (NSWP) in those regions where the latter are stronger. Furthermore, we observe that, as political decentralization advanced, SWP seem to have been more inclined to adopt co-operative behaviour towards NSWP. Overall, our findings suggest that SWP's strategies are not simply interconnected across levels but rather regional government formation decisions are hierarchically subject to central-level considerations.
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