Typicality, Graded Membership, and Vagueness

James A. Hampton

Cognitive Science · 2007 · 306 citations · 53 references

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TL;DR

The paper discusses arguments that degree of membership and typicality are fundamentally distinct aspects of conceptual representations. The study aims to resolve theoretical issues about vagueness in language terms and concepts by proposing a Threshold Model of prototype theory and outlining solutions to logical self‑contradiction and tautology. The authors develop a Threshold Model linking degrees of membership to typicality and relate graded membership to socially constructed conceptual boundaries. The authors argue that prototype theory intuitions adequately explain typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vague classes.

Abstract

This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address arguments advanced by Osherson and Smith (1997), and Kamp and Partee (1995), that the two notions of degree of membership and typicality must relate to fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations. A version of prototype theory-the Threshold Model-is proposed to counter these arguments and three possible solutions to the problems of logical selfcontradiction and tautology for vague categorizations are outlined. In the final section graded membership is related to the social construction of conceptual boundaries maintained through language use.

References

53