Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization · 2003 · 16 citations · 9 references
LawBusiness EconomicsAntitrust LawCartel EnforcementPublic Enforcement Of Competition LawAsymmetric InformationInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsInformation Exchange EnforcementAsymmetric Information ExchangeConceptual Model DevelopmentLivestock Market PricesMandatory Reporting PoliciesMandatory Reporting RegimesMarket Transparency EffectsMarket Transparency RulesPackers
This paper develops a conceptual model that analyzes the impact of increasing market transparency under the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 on the incentives for collusion in the U.S. meatpacking industry. More than likely, meatpackers will have asymmetric priors regarding the distribution of livestock prices. Moreover, they lack the incentives to voluntarily reveal their real priors. Thus, the enforcer of the Act faces a problem of asymmetric information regarding the informativeness of publicly disclosed market reports relative to that of packers priors. Analytical results predict that divergent priors of Bayesian packers can be updated by more informative market reports, so that the resultant posteriors converge, enabling packers to identify a more efficient, unanimous trigger price. This enhances observability of deviations from collusive behavior, and increases the internal policing efficiency by a cartel that employs trigger price strategies to monitor deviations by its members. Contrary to the Acts well-intended objectives, this is consistent with promoting collusion and decreasing market efficiency.
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Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
Robert H. Porter · Journal of Economic Theory · 1983 · 282 citations · Full text