Which Entrepreneurs Bribe and what do they Get from It? Exploratory Evidence from Vietnam

Gjalt de Jong, Phan Anh Tú, Hans van Ees

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · 2010 · 152 citations · 70 references

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TL;DR

Bribery lets entrepreneurs build informal ties with officials, gaining benefits but risking inefficient resource allocation. The article examines whether bribery in emerging economies affects performance and whether its returns diminish. Using a survey of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs, the study estimates the bribery–performance link while controlling for entrepreneurial, organizational, and industrial characteristics. Results reveal a hill‑shaped, non‑monotonic relationship between bribery and revenues.

Abstract

This article investigates whether bribery in emerging economies matters and whether such bribery has a diminishing return to performance. Bribery allows entrepreneurs to develop and foster a network of informal relationships with public officials, and reap the accompanying benefits; but it may also have disadvantages, such as an inefficient allocation of resources. The relationship between bribery and performance was estimated using unique data derived from a survey of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs. We controlled for various entrepreneurial, organizational, and industrial characteristics. The exploratory results provide support for a hill–shaped non–monotonic relationship between bribery and revenues.

References

70