British Journal of Political Science · 1986 · 175 citations · 18 references
Social SciencesEconomicsPolitical ScienceCollective BehaviorPolitical EconomySocial MovementsCollective ActionCollective ResponsibilityPublic ChoicePublic GoodsPublic-good ProvisionSocial Movement ParticipationAnti-nuclear MovementCollective Action IncentivesCollective Action TheoryCollective RewardsInstitutional Incentives For CooperationMass ParticipationSocial Incentives
The standard explanation of collective action in modern political economy can be outlined as follows: a collective (or public) good is only an incentive for a joint contribution to its provision, if those who benefit from the good at least perceive some influence arising from their contribution, the costs of contributing being otherwise greater than the benefits derived from it; otherwise joint efforts for the provision of the collective good will not ensue. If the good itself does not stimulate collective action, contributions will nevertheless occur when selective incentives become effective. These are benefits arising from contributing and/or costs resulting from no contribution being made.
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An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Edward C. Banfield, Anthony J. Downs · Midwest Journal of Political Science · 1958 · 18.9K citations
The Logic of Collective Action.
Robert T. Golembiewski, Mancur Olson · American Sociological Review · 1966 · 11.6K citations
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
William H. Riker, Peter C. Ordeshook · American Political Science Review · 1968 · 1.9K citations
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
William H. Riker, Peter C. Ordeshook · American Political Science Review · 1968 · 1.9K citations