Feedback Produces Divergence From Prospect Theory in Descriptive Choice

TLDR

A recent study showed that experience‑based choices underweight small probabilities, unlike the overweighting seen in typical descriptive paradigms. We tested whether trial‑by‑trial feedback in a repeated descriptive paradigm would shift choices toward experiential or descriptive patterns. Feedback in the repeated gambling task caused participants to underweight small probabilities compared to no‑feedback controls, and individual‑level model comparison showed that feedback shifted decision weights toward objective probability weighting.

Abstract

A recent study demonstrated that individuals making experience-based choices underweight small probabilities, in contrast to the overweighting observed in a typical descriptive paradigm. We tested whether trial-by-trial feedback in a repeated descriptive paradigm would engender choices more correspondent with experiential or descriptive paradigms. The results of a repeated gambling task indicated that individuals receiving feedback underweighted small probabilities, relative to their no-feedback counterparts. These results implicate feedback as a critical component during the decision-making process, even in the presence of fully specified descriptive information. A model comparison at the individual-subject level suggested that feedback drove individuals' decision weights toward objective probability weighting.