Unconditional security in quantum cryptography

Dominic Mayers

Journal of the ACM · 2001 · 1K citations · 24 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The study describes basic techniques for proving the unconditional security of quantum cryptography. These techniques are applied to a noisy variant of the Bennett–Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol, requiring each transmitted signal to be a single photon or two‑dimensional system in the exact protocol state, while imposing no detector restrictions beyond basis‑independent detection probability.

Abstract

Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1984]. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.

References

24