Resources at Marriage and Intrahousehold Allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa*

TLDR

The study tests the unitary versus collective household model using data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Human capital and individual assets at marriage are used as proxies for bargaining power, based on specially designed data from the four countries. All four countries reject the unitary household model yet accept Pareto efficiency; in Bangladesh and South Africa, women’s assets raise education spending shares, while in Ethiopia men’s assets have that effect, with differing implications for boys and girls.

Abstract

Abstract We test the unitary versus collective model of the household using specially designed data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. Human capital and individual assets at the time of marriage are used as proxy measures for bargaining power. In all four countries, we reject the unitary model as a description of household behaviour, but fail to reject the hypothesis that households are Pareto‐efficient. In Bangladesh and South Africa, women's assets increase expenditure shares on education, while in Ethiopia it is men's assets that have this effect. These increases have different implications for boys and girls across countries, however.