Vulnerability Assessment of Cybersecurity for SCADA Systems Using Attack Trees

Chee‐Wooi Ten, Chen‐Ching Liu, Manimaran Govindarasu

IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting · 2007 · 188 citations · 7 references

Concepts

TL;DR

SCADA systems can be remotely compromised to control power grids, making cybersecurity a critical threat to online power system operations. The study proposes a methodology to assess cybersecurity vulnerability in SCADA systems using attack trees. The authors construct attack trees based on power‑system control networks, quantify vulnerabilities using existing cybersecurity conditions, evaluate vulnerability indices, and impose upper bounds on scenario vulnerabilities to identify pivotal attack leaves for countermeasure prioritization. The framework is extensible to security investment analysis.

Abstract

By penetrating the SCADA system, an intruder may remotely operate a power system using supervisory control privileges. Hence, cybersecurity has been recognized as a major threat due to the potential intrusion to the online system. This paper proposes a methodology to evaluate the cybersecurity vulnerability using attack trees. The attack tree formulation based on power system control networks is used to evaluate the system, scenario, and leaf vulnerabilities. The measure of vulnerabilities in the power system control framework is determined based on existing cybersecurity conditions before the vulnerability indices are evaluated. After the indices are evaluated, an upper bound is imposed on each scenario vulnerability in order to determine the pivotal attack leaves that require countermeasure improvements. The proposed framework can be extended to security investment analysis.

References

7