Motivating Agents: How Much Does the Mission Matter?

TLDR

Economic theory predicts that agents work harder if they believe in the mission of the organization. The study tests how mission alignment affects effort by randomly assigning workers with known mission preferences to organizations with clear or unclear missions. The experiment uses a real‑effort task and random assignment of workers to organizations with or without clear missions. Results show that matching workers to a clear mission strongly boosts effort, performance pay raises effort mainly among mismatched workers who trade pay for mission fit, underscoring the value of clear missions and careful sorting, screening, and compensation design.

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that agents work harder if they believe in the mission of the organization. We conduct a real-effort experiment with workers whose mission preferences are known, randomly assigning them to organizations with clear missions to create both matches and mismatches. Our estimates suggest that matching is a strong motivator, especially compared to mismatches. Further, we find that performance pay increases effort, though mostly among mismatched workers who substitute pay for matching. Our results suggest the importance of defining a clear mission to an organization and highlight the significance of sorting, screening, and compensation policies.