Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter

Dia Anagnostou, Alina Mungiu‐Pippidi

European Journal of International Law · 2014 · 61 citations · 2 references

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TL;DR

Recent scholarship has shifted from questioning whether human rights treaties improve state behavior to examining domestic factors that shape compliance with those treaties. This study investigates which domestic factors explain why some European states promptly implement ECHR judgments while others delay or resist. The analysis shows that states with strong legal infrastructure and high government effectiveness consistently implement ECHR judgments, whereas weaker states are more likely to obstruct or ignore them.

Abstract

Over the past couple of years, international law and international relations scholarship has shifted its focus from the question of whether human rights treaties bring any state-level improvements at all to investigations in the domestic context of the factors and dy namics influencing state compliance. In this direction, and focusing on the European Court of Human Rights, this study inquires into the factors that account for variable patterns of state compliance with its judgments. Why do national authorities in some states adopt a more prompt and responsive attitude in implementing these judgments, in contrast to other states that procrastinate or respond reluctantly? On the basis of a large-N study of the Strasbourg Court's judgments and a comparison across nine states, this article argues that variation in state implementation performance is closely linked to the overall legal infrastructure capacity and government effectiveness of a state. When such capacity and effectiveness are high and diffused, the adverse judgments of the Strasbourg Court are unlikely to be obstructed or ignored, even when the government, political elites, or other actors are reluctant and not in favour of substantive remedies.

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