COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING

TLDR

The study combines noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model to examine how protocol design variations influence coalition formation success and to derive normative policy implications and future research directions. The authors use a noncooperative game‑theoretic framework, integrating an assessment model, to analyze the effects of single versus multiple coalitions, membership openness, consensus strength, and transfer options on coalition formation. The results are compared with evidence from past international environmental treaties, leading to an agenda for future research. ABSTRACT.

Abstract

ABSTRACT. We combine new concepts of noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model on climate change to analyze the impact of different protocol designs on the success of coalition formation. We analyze the role of “single versus multiple coalitions,”“open versus exclusive membership,”“no, weak and strong consensus about membership” and “no transfers versus transfers.” First, we want to find out whether and how modifications of the standard assumptions affect results that are associated with the widely applied cartel formation game in the noncooperative game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements. Second, we discuss normative policy conclusions that emerge from the various modifications. Third, we confront our results with evidence on past international environmental treaties and derive an agenda for future research.