School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

TLDR

School choice hinges on designing student assignment mechanisms, yet existing plans lack specific solutions and generate parental appeals due to their flaws. The authors formulate school choice as a mechanism design problem and analyze existing plans in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. They analyze these plans and propose two alternative mechanisms that could address critical school choice issues. Existing plans have serious shortcomings, and the authors propose two alternative mechanisms that could provide practical solutions to critical school choice issues.

Abstract

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism. Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.