Writing the Rules to Rank the Candidates: Examining the Impact of Instant-Runoff Voting on Racial Group Turnout in San Francisco Mayoral Elections

Abstract

:Instant-runoff voting (IRV)—a relatively new electoral reform adopted in several cities in the United States—gives voters the option to rank-order more than one candidate preference for each office. When no candidate initially obtains a majority of first choice votes, rank-ordered preferences are used to “instantly” calculate a winner without requiring a separate runoff election. The impact of IRV on racial group voter turnout in urban elections has not previously been subject to rigorous analysis. Based on racial group interest theory, I argue that the complexity of IRV increases information costs and obscures racial group interests for voters. Analysis of precinct-level racial group voter turnout rates in five San Francisco mayoral elections from 1995 to 2011 reveals a significant relationship between IRV and decreased turnout among Black and White voters. IRV exacerbates turnout disparities related to age and education in the population, but decreases the effect of income. The relationship between turnout and racial diversity is diminished among some groups.