Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets

Joseph E. Stiglitz

The World Bank Economic Review · 1990 · 1.3K citations · 6 references

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TL;DR

Institutional lenders must ensure borrowers use funds prudently to enhance repayment likelihood, and while peer monitoring—used successfully by programs such as Grameen Bank—helps achieve this, it also incurs costs. The study models peer monitoring in a competitive credit market to examine its effects. Peer monitoring requires neighbors to pay a penalty if the borrower defaults, thereby transferring risk from the bank to the cosigner. The model shows that this risk transfer improves borrowers' welfare.

Abstract

A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced. One partial solution is peer monitoring: having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt. Peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere. But peer monitoring has a cost. It transfers risk from the bank, which is in a better position to bear risk, to the cosigner. In a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market, this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers' welfare.

References

6