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<scp>The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries</scp>
198
Citations
9
References
2006
Year
Independent AgentsInsurer RelationshipsFinancial ProtectionInsurance IndustryInsurance DistributionInsurance FraudRisk ManagementManagementEconomic AnalysisInsurance RegulationsInsuranceIndependent Insurance IntermediariesEconomicsLiability (Financial Accounting)Market MechanismFinancePrivate InsuranceInsurance MarketsInsurance LawBusinessEmpirical Evidence
Insurance intermediaries act as market makers, matching policyholders with insurers and earning compensation through premium‑based and contingent commissions. The study analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries in the commercial property‑casualty market, examining their roles, market competitiveness, compensation structures, and policy placement processes. The authors conduct a comprehensive analysis of intermediaries’ roles, market competitiveness, compensation arrangements, and policy placement procedures in the commercial property‑casualty sector. Empirical evidence shows that premium‑based and contingent commissions are passed to policyholders, while contingent commissions promote competitive bidding, improve risk‑selection confidence, break the winner’s curse, and encourage aggressive insurer bids, thereby reducing information asymmetries and enhancing market efficiency.
Abstract This article analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries (brokers and independent agents), focusing on the commercial property–casualty insurance market. The article investigates the functions performed by intermediaries, the competitiveness of the market, the compensation arrangements for intermediaries, and the process by which policies are placed with insurers. Insurance intermediaries are essentially market makers who match the insurance needs of policyholders with insurers who have the capability of meeting those needs. Intermediary compensation comprises premium‐based commissions, expressed as a percentage of the premium paid, and contingent commissions based on the profitability, persistency, and/or volume of the business placed with the insurer. Empirical evidence is provided that premium‐based and contingent commissions are passed on to policyholders in the premium. However, contingent commissions can enhance competitive bidding by aligning the insurer's and the intermediary's interests. This alignment of interests gives insurers more confidence in the selection of risks and thus helps to break the “winner's curse” and encourages insurers to bid more aggressively. Independent intermediaries also help markets operate more efficiently by reducing the information asymmetries between insurers and buyers that can cause adverse selection.
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