Journal of Conflict Resolution · 2013 · 69 citations · 55 references
BusinessInternational BusinessInternational ManagementForeign Direct InvestmentInternational EconomicsInternational Political EconomyCorporate NationalityCross-border TransactionsForeign Direct Investment LawForeign Direct Investment RegulationInternational Corporate GovernanceTransnational CorporationsBreach DetectionCorporate Nationality Of InvestorsForeign Capital FlowsForeign Direct Investment AnalysisForeign Direct Investment ContractsHost Government ContractsMultinational Corporate GovernanceMultinational Enterprise Nationality
Since 1990, governments around the developing world have broken contracts made with multinational corporations (MNCs), but the incidence of breach varies across countries and over time. I argue that shared firm nationality is a key determinant of contract sanctity. MNCs are likely to divert investments or exit in response to breach with a firm of the same nationality but unlikely to react in ways costly to the host government otherwise. At the level of the economy as a whole, host governments gain permissive space to trade-off among national groups of investors when a greater diversity of foreign direct investment nationalities is present. I use national-, firm-, and dyadic-level data from 1990 to 2008 to demonstrate nationality-tied firm responses to breach. Counterintuitively, deeper integration with more nationally diverse MNCs enables more breach, as governments gain space to prioritize other goals over the property and preferences of foreign capital.
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Longitudinal Data Analysis for Discrete and Continuous Outcomes
Scott L. Zeger, Kung‐Yee Liang · Biometrics · 1986 · 7.8K citations
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Adriaan Schout, Douglas C. North · The Economic Journal · 1991 · 4.8K citations
Social Sciences, Economics, History +15
OVERCOMING THE LIABILITY OF FOREIGNNESS.
Syed Ahsan Zaheer · Academy of Management Journal · 1995 · 3.6K citations